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THE UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS: A NO-
FAULT FIX 
Eric Lindenfeld* 
There is an ongoing and concerning public health problem in 
the United States relating to unintended pregnancies. Despite the 
fact that women consistently express dissatisfaction with existing 
contraception methods, the availability of cutting edge 
technologies remains stagnant. This paper argues that the threat 
of liability in the form on product liability lawsuits dissuades 
contraceptive manufacturers from innovating. This paper 
proposes a no-fault fix to the problem modeled around the 
National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986. 
 
* I would like to thank Professor Judith T. Younger at University of Minnesota Law 
School for her invaluable feedback and support. I would also like to thank the editors 
of Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review. The views expressed in this 
Article are solely of the authors, not of their employers or academic affiliations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, there is an ongoing and concerning 
public health problem: the large number of unintended 
pregnancies.  Over one-half of the 6.6 million annual pregnancies 
in the United States are unintended.1  According to some 
estimates, a woman in the United States should expect to have 
1.42 unintended pregnancies by age forty-five.2  The United 
States unintended pregnancy rate is considerably higher than the 
comparable rate in many other developed, first world countries.3  
While it is true that two-thirds of women in the United States are 
on some form of contraception,4 almost half of all unintended 
pregnancies result from women who use their contraception 
inconsistently or incorrectly.5  The remaining fifty-four percent of 
unintended pregnancies are a result of women who continue to 
abstain from any contraceptive method at all.6 
The unintended pregnancy rate is particularly concerning 
given that childbirths that result from unintended or closely 
spaced pregnancies are correlated with negative outcomes for the 
parent and child.7  For example, research has shown that, 
compared to women who become pregnant intentionally, “women 
who experience unintended pregnancies have a higher incidence 
of mental-health problems, have less stabled romantic 
relationships, experience higher rates of physical abuse, and are 
more likely to have abortions or to delay the initiation of prenatal 
care.”8  Similarly, children resulting from unintended pregnancies 
are at risk of experiencing negative physical and mental health 
issues, and “are more likely to drop out of high school and to 
 
 1.  See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 
2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html 
(“Currently, about half (51% of the 6.6 million pregnancies in the United States each 
year (3.4 million) are unintended.”). 
 2.  Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Gender Norms and Contraceptive Trust, 23 ALB. L. 
J. SCI. & TECH. 581, 599 (2013). 
 3.  See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, supra note 1. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See Campo-Engelstein, supra note 2, at 599-600 (“Women who are dissatisfied 
with their contraceptive method are at high risk for experiencing a gap in 
contraceptive coverage.”). 
 6.  See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, supra note 1. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Adam Thomas & Emily Monea, The High Cost of Unintended Pregnancy, CTR. 
ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES AT BROOKINGS 2 (July 2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/7/uninteded-pregnancy-
thomas-monea/07_unintended_pregnancy_thomas_monea.pdf. 
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engage in delinquent behavior during their teenage years.”9 
This paper proceeds in four parts.  Part II of this paper details 
the unintended pregnancy crisis and explains how it can be 
attributed to dissatisfaction with existing contraceptive products.  
Part III offers an overview of the past forty years of product 
liability lawsuits for contraceptive products, and argues that the 
threat of liability is the reason for the lack of innovation of new, 
cutting edge contraceptive products.  Part IV then explores, in 
depth, the theories proffered by advocates of federal preemption, 
ultimately concluding that it is a poor solution and an 
unnecessarily broad approach to the growing crisis.  Having 
established the fundamental issues and misunderstandings, Part 
V argues that the most plausible solution to the unintended 
pregnancy crisis is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured 
by contraceptive products.  Additionally, this Article argues that 
such a scheme could be modeled around the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA),10 which has proven to be 
successful at insulating manufacturers from unpredictable 
liability11 as well as stimulating research into cutting edge 
products.12  Most importantly, NCVIA has been shown to be 
extremely effective in offering injured consumers an equitable 
form of compensation.13 
II. THE UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS 
A.  DISSATISFACTION WITH EXISTING CONTRACEPTIVE 
METHODS 
The Guttmacher Institute has found that the most widely 
reported reason for contraceptive nonuse or misuse includes 
dissatisfaction with available contraceptive methods and 
concerns about side effects of alternatives.14  For example, the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) has found that nearly thirty 
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for Vaccine 
Injury, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 537, 551 (2010) 
 11.  Clare Looker & Heath Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse 
Events Attributed to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes, WHO (July 
18, 2016), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/5/10-081901/en/. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Sneha Barot, In Search of Breakthroughs: Renewing Support for 
Contraceptive Research and Development, 16 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 1, 2 (2013), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/1/gpr160124.html. 
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percent of all users stop using the pill due to side effects that 
include “nausea, weight gain, sore or swollen breasts, spotting 
and mood changes.”15  In 2010, a study conducted by the Journal 
of Family Practice determined that only fifty-seven percent of 
women on the pill were happy with it.16  In fact, studies still show 
that even the use of lower dose hormonal contraceptive pills 
subjects the user to high risks of depression and decreases in 
libido.17  Most other methods of contraception have 
discontinuation rates of almost fifty percent after one year of 
use.18  A more recent report published by the CDC has found that 
nearly half the women surveyed had discontinued some form of 
contraception because they disliked it or were concerned about its 
side effects, and almost one-third of all women tried five or more 
types of birth control.19 
Despite the fact that women consistently express 
dissatisfaction with existing contraception methods, the 
availability of cutting-edge contraceptive methods remains 
stagnant.20  To be clear, there have been important advances since 
the advent of the pill; developments such as contraceptive 
implants, patches, and vaginal rings have all attempted to meet 
the diverse needs of women throughout their reproductive lives.21  
However, these items have predominantly been variations of pre-
existing technologies, such as variants of hormone dosage levels 
and delivery methods as opposed to any significant technological 
breakthrough.22  Indeed, a close examination of the contraceptive 
landscape reveals that all birth control continues to fit into the 
following four categories: barrier method, hormonal method, 
natural method, and permanent method.23  It appears then, that 
 
 15.  See Nadia Kounang, For Birth Control, What’s Old is New Again, CNN (Jan. 
8, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/08/health/fertility-awareness-methods/ 
(“Some 30& of women quit hormonal birth control because of the side effects.”). 
 16.  Ann Friedman, Why Isn’t Birth Control Getting Better?, GOOD: A MAGAZINE 
FOR THE GLOB. CITIZEN (Apr. 24, 2011), https://www.good.is/articles/why-isn-t-birth-
control-getting-better. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Campo-Engelstein, supra note 2, at 600. 
 19.  Madeleine Schwartz, Where’s Better Birth Control?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 
2014) http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/wheres-better-birth-control. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See id. (“There have been some new developments: contraceptive implants, 
patches, and vaginal rings, like the NuvaRing, free users from having to take a daily 
pill; ella, a pill that can be taken up to five days after sex, received F.D.A. approval in 
2010.”). 
 22.  See Barot, supra note 14, at 1. 
 23.  What Are The Different Types of Contraception?, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER 
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any new contraceptives marketed today are simply modifications 
of technologies and sciences that are more than fifty years old.24 
B.  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTO ALTERNATIVES 
REMAIN STAGNANT 
It should not come as a surprise that technological 
developments in the contraceptive arena is moribund—
investment in this field is at an all-time low.25  Commercial 
investment for research of new contraceptive methods accounted 
for only $33 million in 2013.26  Pharmaceutical companies are 
simply not interested in developing contraceptive products.  For 
example, a survey conducted by the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), has indicated that, for 371 
female-specific new drugs on the market, only ten were 
contraceptives; there were, however, “71 new drugs for women’s 
cancers, 55 for arthritis, 45 for autoimmune diseases, 41 for 
diabetes, and 31 for psychiatric conditions.”27  Since, generally 
speaking, new drug discovery and development is led by the 
private sector, it is troubling that most large pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies have largely abandoned the field of 
contraceptive research and development.28 
This extreme lull in contraceptive research exists despite 
clear indications that women are desperately searching for 
alternative options.29  For example, a recent study indicated that 
women would enjoy the option to take the “Pericoital” 
contraceptive, a discreet alternative to an everyday pill.30  In 
effect, Pericoital would allow women a safe option to take a 
 
NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEV. (last reviewed Apr. 3, 2013), 
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/contraception/conditioninfo/Pages/types.aspx
. 
 24.  Elizabeth Siegel Watkins, How the Pill Became a Lifestyle Drug: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Birth Control in the United States Since 1960, 102 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1, 1 (2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3464843/. 
 25.  See Barot, supra note 14, at 7-8. 
 26.  Mary Moran et al., Reproductive Health: R&D For the Developing World, Pol’y 
Cures: G-Finder 11 (2014), http://www.policy 
cures.org/downloads/RH%20full%20report.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
 27.  ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 437-38 (19th ed. 
2007). 
 28.  See Barot, supra note 14, at 7. 
 29.  See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 2. 
 30.  Jane K. Cover et al., Consumer Perspectives on a Pericoital Contraceptive Pill 
in India and Uganda, 39(4) GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 6 (2013), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3919513.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
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contraceptive before or after sex rather than on an everyday 
basis.31  However, as of yet, Pericoital has not been brought to 
market in the United States.32  Similarly, movement on a 
contraceptive gel that women could rub on their arm or leg has 
been slow, despite reports that the drug could be a revolutionary, 
and almost side effect-less alternative to the birth control pill.33  
Multipurpose prevention technologies, which would 
simultaneously protect against pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted diseases have also been slow to come to market.34  
Finally, while there has been talk for over thirty years about a 
male contraceptive, none have yet been brought to market in the 
United States.35  Commentators have suggested that this lack of 
contraceptive research development is not a result of any demand-
based deficiency.36 
III. CONTRACEPTIVES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
It has been argued that threat of liability is the primary 
reason for private sector abandonment of the field of contraceptive 
research and development.37  Pharmaceutical companies, driven 
largely by profit, are simply responding to the legitimate threat of 
large-scale lawsuits.  Given the tremendous risk of liability, and 
the associated damaging publicity, investments in contraceptive 
 
 31.  Evette Dionne, A Different Kind of Birth Control Pill, N.Y. TIMES: THE 
OPINION PAGES, Jan. 10, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/01/thinking-beyond-the-birth-
control-pill/a-different-kind-of-birth-control-pill. 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  Clay Dillow, Daily Rub-On Contraceptive Skin Gel Could Replace the Pill, 
POPULAR SCIENCE, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-10/daily-
contraceptive-gel-effective-pill-without-side-effects. 
 34.  See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 2. 
 35.  Latest Research on New Birth Control Methods, Epigee Women’s Health, 
http://www.epigee.org/guide/future.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
 36.  See Annette L. Marthaler, The FDA Defense: A Prescription for Easing the 
Pain of Punitive Damage Awards in Medical Products Liability Cases, 19 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 451, 471 (1996). 
 37.  See, e.g., Jerome F. Strauss III & Michael Kafrissen, Waiting For The Second 
Coming: Contraceptive Research Is Seriously in Need of Revitalization, 432 NATURE 
43, 43-44 (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.nature.com/nature (arguing that liability hinders 
contraceptive researching, depriving 1.5 billion women of innovative products); Anna 
Birenbaum, Shielding the Masses: How Litigation Changed the Face of Birth Control, 
10 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 411, 423 (2001) (discussing Dalkon Shield and 
Norplant litigation, arguing that they had devastating impacts for the industry going 
forward). 
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products are simply no longer profitable.38  The history is clear: in 
the past sixty-five years since the “pill” has been introduced,39 the 
contraceptive arena has been plagued by successive, highly 
publicized product liability lawsuits.40  The increase in product 
liability suits also closely corresponds to the rapid departure from 
the contraceptive market by drug and device manufacturers.  For 
example, prior to the 1970s and 1980s, the United States led the 
world in contraceptive development.41  However, today, there are 
only a few American manufacturers that continue to research and 
develop contraceptive products.42  Any person who continues to 
believe that liability concerns are not heavily influencing 
pharmaceutical company business decisions should consider the 
examples below. 
A.  THE PILL 
The pill is arguably the most socially and economically 
significant invention of the twentieth century.  Introduced in the 
United States in 1960 by G.D. Searle & Co. as nearly 100-percent 
effective, “Envoid” quickly gained recognition as the most reliable 
way for women to control their own fertility.43  However, almost 
immediately following the oral contraceptive’s release, women 
began to report serious side effects including strokes, blood clots, 
cancers, birth defects, aneurysms, and heart attacks.44  
Gynecologists, who were often not informed or were simply 
unaware of the side effects of the pill, frequently dismissed their 
patients’ complaints as exaggerations.45  Others made the 
unilateral decision to not advise their patients as to the side 
effects of the pill, based on the common belief that “women, being 
very ‘emotional,’ might overreact.  Not wanting to unduly alarm 
 
 38.  Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 423. 
 39.  The Birth Control Pill: A History, Planned Parenthood 1, 4 (last updated Mar. 
2013), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/1213/9611/6329/pillhistory.pdf. 
 40.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED., DEVELOPING NEW 
CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 121-22 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. et 
al. eds., 1990), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1450.html. 
 41.  See Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 423. 
 42.  See Barot, supra note 14, at 7. 
 43.  People & Events: The Side Effects of the Pill, PBS: Am. Experience, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_effects.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2016). 
 44.  William M. Brown, Déjà vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive 
Research and How to Reverse It, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 1, 26 (2002). 
 45.  See People & Events: The Side Effects of the Pill, supra note 43. 
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women, doctors took the decision out of their patients’ hands.”46 
It was not long before the product liability suits began to 
enter the courts.  The first case that considered alleged defects in 
the Envoid pill was that of Simonait v. Searle.47  There, the 
plaintiff alleged failure to warn and breach of implied warranty 
after she contracted thrombophlebitis, a blood clot disorder.48  
Following a lengthy jury trial, which included the expert 
testimony by G.D. Searle’s lead investigatory doctors, the jury 
returned a verdict for the defense.49  Another early case, Black v. 
Searle,50 involved G.D. Searle’s Envoid.  The lawsuit was brought 
to trial in 1969 and involved a twenty-nine-year-old woman who 
died from a pulmonary embolism.51  While the plaintiffs were able 
to show that, at the time of the woman’s death, there were more 
than 600 reports of thromboembolic phenomena, they still 
encountered serious problems with respect to proving causation.52  
Ultimately, the jury again found for the defendant, but this time 
added a recommendation to their verdict, suggesting that G.D. 
Searle add more intensive warnings to their product.53 
Motivated by the overwhelming reports from injured women, 
Barbara Seaman, a leading activist and journalist for the women’s 
health movement, authored a book in 1969 that described the 
crisis and the urgent need for safer alternatives.54  In her book, 
Seaman included testimony from world renowned physicians and 
researchers who questioned the safety of the pill.55  The book, 
along with calls from similar activists,56 soon prompted the 
 
 46.  People & Events: The Pill and The Doctor/Patient Relationship, PBS: Am. 
Experience, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_health.html (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
 47.  Circuit Court for County of Kent, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Civil Case No. 
1916, tried May 18-26, 1965; Joyce Barrett, Product Liability and the Pill, 19 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 468, 468 (1970). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Circuit Court for County of Kent, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Civil Case No. 
1916, tried May 18-26, 1965; Barrett, supra note 47, at 469. 
 50.  U.S. Dist. Ct. of Northern District of Indiana—South Bend Division, Civil 
Case No. 4082 (1969); Barrett, supra note 47, at 469. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Barrett, supra note 47, at 469. 
 53.  Id. at 470. 
 54.  Brown, supra note 44, at 26. 
 55.  See People & Events: The Side Effects of the Pill, supra note 43. 
 56.  People & Events: The Senate Holds Hearings on the Pill (1970), PBS: 
American Experience, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_hearings.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2016). 
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United States Senate to hold hearings in January 1970 to address 
the widespread adverse events.57  Almost immediately after the 
hearings, hormone levels in the pill were decreased to a small 
fraction of what they were originally.58  Despite the lower doses, 
product liability lawsuits continued through the 1970s and 1980s, 
but saw limited success as the pills became safer and the 
warnings more comprehensive.59 
B.  DALKON SHIELD 
The Dalkon Shield, invented in 1968, was a device that was 
inserted into a woman’s uterus that prevented the implantation 
of a fertilized egg.60  The intrauterine device, commonly known as 
the “IUD,” was engineered with spikes along its edges to prevent 
instances of natural expulsion from the body.61  The IUD also 
contained a string that passed from the uterus into the vagina.62  
Based upon an impressive, year-long study in which the device 
purportedly achieved a 98.9-percent success rate,63 the device was 
picked up by the A.H Robins Company in 1970.64  From the 
device’s inception, doctors, scientists, and sources within the 
company advised that the product could potentially cause pelvic 
infections, septic abortions, and higher-than-reported pregnancy 
rates.65  Despite the ominous warnings, A.H. Robins Company 
 
 57.  Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills—A System Popping 
Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription to Make Drug 
Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085, 
1086 (2012). 
 58.  Id. at 1087. 
 59.  Sylvia A. Law, Tort Liability and the Availability of Contraceptive Drugs and 
Devices in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 381 (1997). 
 60.  Id. at 362-63. 
 61.  Lucy Vernasco & Arikia Millikan, The IUD’s Long Path to Redemption, 
MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 24, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-iuds-long-path-
to-redemption. 
 62.  Anna C., “Instrument of Torture”: The Dalkon Shield Disaster, Planned 
Parenthood Advocates of Ariz. (Mar. 28, 2016), 
http://advocatesaz.org/2016/03/28/instrument-of-torture-the-dalkon-shield-disaster/. 
 63.  Robert L. Shirley, The Dalkon Shield in Private Practice: A Disappointment, 
in 121 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 564 (1975). 
 64.  Ron Wolf, A.H. Robins’ Struggle Is Over the End of a Dream – And of a 
Nightmare, PHILLY.COM (July 5, 1987), http://articles.philly.com/1987-07-
05/business/26198061_1_robins-board-robins-family-claiborne-robins. 
 65.  Russell Mokhiber, The Dalkon Shield: A Deadly Product from A.H. Robins, 8 
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR: CORP. CRIME & VIOLENCE 1, 2-3 (1987), 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1987/04/ahrobins.html (An internal A.H. 
Robins memo informed almost 40 A.H. Robins executives, just before the Shield 
entered the market, of the dangerous, wicking properties of the string.). 
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marketed the product to the public as “[t]he modern superior 
I.U.D. [providing] safe, sure, sensible contraception.”66  By 1973, 
over three million women were using the new contraceptive 
product.67 
Almost immediately, women began reporting adverse effects 
associated with the shield, including pain and bleeding, uterus 
perforation, and infections that led to miscarriages, stillbirths, 
and death.68  Once again, A.H. Robins Company became aware of 
the reports, but did little to warn doctors about the risks.69  The 
company also failed to investigate the reports.70  Finally, in 1974, 
the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, along with 
the FDA, pressured A.H. Robins Company to suspend the 
manufacture and sale of the Dalkon Shield in the United States 
until the product’s dangers could be more thoroughly 
investigated.71  However, it was not until 1980 that the company 
sent letters to women, urging that they have their Dalkon Shields 
removed, and telling them that A.H. Robins Company would cover 
all associated expenses.72 
The first wave of lawsuits against A.H. Robins Company 
commenced in 1974.73  Known for insinuating that the injured 
woman’s hygiene and sexual misconduct was the impetus for the 
injury, A.H. Robins Company won a number of successive defense 
verdicts.74  In fact, in the 1970s, the company was only required 
to pay out an average of $11,000 per claim.75  However, in 1983, 
the tide turned for plaintiffs when the small firm handling a 
 
 66.  Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 195-96 (Colo. 1984). 
 67.  See Law, supra note 59, at 364. 
 68.  See Mokhiber, supra note 65, at 2. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See Law, supra note 59, at 365. 
 72.  David Ranii, First Public Federal Disciple Hearing, 6 Jud. Conduct Rep. 1, 5 
(1984) (“Robins took the Dalkon Shield off the market in 1974 and, in 1980, mailed a 
letter to 200,000 physicians and government agencies recommending the removal of 
the device from any women still using it. But the product has never been recalled, and 
critics of the shield believe an untold number of women are still wearing it today.”). 
 73.  Charles A. Homsy, How FDA Regulations and Injury Litigation Cripple the 
Medical Device Industry, USA TODAY (July 2003), 
http://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-104971300/how-fda-regulations-and-injury-
litigation-cripple. 
 74.  See Mokhiber, supra note 65, at 3-4 (“At trial, the company has, in some 
instances, sought to defend itself by shifting the blame to the victims. A.H. Robins’ 
attorneys have argued that frequent sexual intercourse with multiple partners could 
cause injuries currently being blamed on the shield.”). 
 75.  See Law, supra note 60, at 366. 
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majority of the cases was forced to pass the cases to a large and 
experienced Minneapolis-based firm Robins, Zelle, Larson and 
Kaplan.76  Led by high-powered attorneys, Dale Larson and 
Michael Ciresi, the plaintiffs managed to consolidate a number of 
their cases and secured successive multi-million dollar verdicts 
based on defective design and willful negligence claims.77  News 
of Ciresi’s and Larson’s victories soon emboldened other plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to pursue Dalkon Shield cases.78  Faced with billions of 
dollars in liability exposure and damaging press, A.H. Robins 
Company filed for bankruptcy in 1986.79 
Kirsten Thompson, researcher at the University of 
California, San Francisco, noted the effect that A.H. Robins 
Company’s bankruptcy had on the industry: “The idea that a 
company could go bankrupt because of a contraceptive product 
was pretty horrifying.”80  Indeed, Dalkon Shield litigation and the 
resulting bankruptcy cast a shadow over IUD development for the 
past thirty years.81  From 1983 to 1988, not a single IUD was 
marketed in the United States, as the horror stories still lingered 
in women’s consciences.82  In 1988, a newer type of IUD, 
“Paragarud,” was introduced but achieved limited success.83  It 
took another eleven years until “Mirena,” a modern version of the 
hormonal IUD was developed.84  Mirena has seen more success 
than previous IUDs,85 but manufacturers, still tentative about 
future liability, have consistently charged astronomical prices for 
these devices at approximately $500 to $800 per device.86  
 
 76.  Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD 
BANKRUPTCY 16 (1991). 
 77.  Guide to the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust Collection, VIRGINIA HERITAGE 
(2002), http://ead.lib.virginia.edu/vivaxtf/view?docId=uva-law/viu00041.xml. 
 78.  Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2006), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2690500085.html. 
 79.  Ultimately, over $3 billion was paid to Dalkon Shield victims. See THOMAS H. 
KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 119 (2001). 
 80.  See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 3. 
 81.  Id. at 2. 
 82.  Clare L. Roepke & Eric A. Schaff, Long Tail Strings: Impact of the Dalkon 
Shield 40 Years Later, OPEN J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 996, 1001 (2014). 
 83.  Martha Kempner, FDA Approves New IUD Designed to Be More Affordable, 
RH Reality Check (Mar. 13, 2015), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2015/03/13/fda-
approves-new-iud-designed-affordable/. 
 84.  See Roepke & Schaff, supra note 82, at 1001-02. 
 85.  See The IUD Is Getting More Popular in America. Here’s Why, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/24/iud-birth-
control_n_6736218.html. 
 86.  More US Women Choosing IUDs for Birth Control, FOX NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/08/02/more-us-women-choosing-iuds-for-birth-
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Moreover, thirty-percent of health providers continue to be 
unconvinced of the safety of IUDs for women who have never 
given birth.87  This is despite the fact that the newest IUD devices 
have proven to be extraordinarily safe and are no endorsed by the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.88 
C.  NORPLANT 
Norplant was the first implant contraceptive marketed in the 
United States.89  The drug consisted of six hormone-releasing, 
silicone coated rods implanted under the skin in the arm.90  The 
drug was essentially a new delivery method for levonorgestrel, a 
manufactured hormone previously used in the pill forms of birth 
control.91  The drug, which cost upwards of $114 million to 
develop,92 boasted an effectiveness period of five years.93  First 
introduced by the New York based non-profit, “Population 
Council,”94 and eventually brought to market by Wyeth-Ayerst in 
1991,95 Norplant became one of the most popular contraceptives 
in the United States.96  As of 1995, nearly one million United 
States women, and 2.5 million women worldwide, used the 
Norplant device.97  In sharp contrast to the Dalkon Shield, 
Norplant underwent comprehensive studies before being 
 
control.html. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  The Single-Rod Contraceptive Implant, ASS’N OF REPROD. HEALTH PROF’LS 
(July 2008), http://www.arhp.org/publications-and-resources/clinical-
proceedings/Single-Rod/History. 
 90.  Drug Company Draws Criticism for Norplant Pricing, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(Sept. 7, 1993), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1993-09-
07/business/9309030724_1_norplant-ayres-planning-clinic. 
 91.  See Brown, supra note 44, at 30. 
 92.  Christopher Connell, Norplant Developer Accused Of Making Excessive 
Profits, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 11, 1993), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19931111&slug=1731089
. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See The Single-Rod Contraceptive Implant, supra note 89. 
 95.  See Drug Company Draws Criticism for Norplant Pricing, supra note 90. 
 96.  CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, INTRODUCTION, AND USE: LESSONS FROM 
NORPLANT 110 (Polly F. Harrison & Allan Rosenfield eds., 1998). 
 97.  Sharon Cohen, Norplant Lawsuits Flourish Along With Women’s Reports of 
Problems: Medicine: Some Who Have Used the Implanted Contraceptive Have Reported 
Serious Side Effects. The Drug Company Defends its Product and Blames Predatory 
Lawyers for the Furor., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-10-
08/news/mn-54703_1_side-effects/2. 
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introduced to the market.98  Additionally, Norplant was much 
more straightforward with respect to listing potential side effects 
in its marketing campaign than was Dalkon Shield.99 
Inspired by the large verdicts in the Dalkon Shield lawsuits 
of the 1980s,100 plaintiffs attorneys boasted thousands of 
claimants that complained of “the now-discredited shifting 
constellation of symptoms . . . [of] . . . an ill-defined array of auto-
immune disorders.”101  Initially attributed to the silicone casting 
on the implant,102 and eventually to the hormones within the 
implant itself,103 symptoms were almost always reversible and 
dissipated once the device was removed from the patient.104  
Despite the comparatively benign nature of the product and the 
comprehensiveness of the warnings on the device,105 there were 
soon several class action suits pending against the manufacturer 
of Norplant.106  By 1995, as many as 50,000 women alleged serious 
personal injury lawsuits against the manufacturer, with the 
claims being consolidated in federal court.107 
Finally, in 2002, after a tumultuous decade of litigation and 
faltering sales of the device, Wyeth suspended sales of Norplant 
in the United States.108  While Norplant had managed to achieve 
significant legal victories and favorable settlement 
 
 98.  See Research, Introduction, and Use: Advancing From Norplant, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Dec. 1998), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10095968. 
 99.  Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 430. Birenbaum provides a compelling case that 
Norplant is a safe, convenient, and effective contraceptive product that was destroyed 
by plaintiffs’ attorneys and poor publicity. 
 100.  Jennifer Mesko, Mirena IUD Litigation Revives Memories of Dalkon Shield 
Injuries, DRUGWATCH (June 28, 2013), http://drugwatch.com/2013/06/28/mirena-
litigation-dalkon-shield-injuries/. 
 101.  Mark Arkin, Products Liability and the Threat to Contraception, MANHATTAN 
INST. 1, 8-9 (Feb. 1, 1999), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjm_36.html. 
 102.  See Brown, supra note 44, at 33. 
 103.  Id. at 33-34. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  L. Stuart Ditzen, How A Promising Contraceptive Fell Victim To Lawsuits 
Norplant’s Pa. Maker Has Spent Millions Defending It. Those Who Have Sued Have 
Yet to Win A Cent, Or A Major Court Ruling, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 30, 1998), 
http://articles.philly.com/1998-12-30/news/25722492_1_norplant-lawsuits-side-
effects-wyeth-ayerst-laboratories. 
 107.  Steven Garber, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER 
LITIGATION INVOLVING THE SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS, RAND 
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 38 (2013). 
 108.  See Garber, supra note 107, at 38-39. 
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negotiations,109 the Norplant device was simply unable to recover 
from the negative publicity.110  Such publicity caused sales of the 
drug to plunge dramatically, from 800 units per day in 1993, to 
sixty units per day in 1995.111  Sadly, Norplant has since been 
shown to be one of the most highly efficacious contraceptives ever 
marketed, with failure rates just under one-percent.112  Most 
significantly, it has been shown that some of the worst side effects 
tend to peter out by the end of the first year of use.113  Anna 
Birnbaum, a notable female health scholar, notes that the real 
loser of the Norplant litigation was women, who no longer have 
access to an otherwise safe and effective birth control method.114 
D.  RECENT LAWSUITS 
Following the Norplant litigation, a few other contraceptive-
related personal injury lawsuits have grabbed headlines.  
“Yasmin” and “Yaz” were contraceptive pills brought to the 
United States market by Bayer in 2001 and 2006, respectively.115  
Both products contain a blend of synthetic hormones known as 
drospirenone and ethinyl estradiol,116 although Yaz contains a 
lower level of ethinyl estradiol than Yasmin.117  These two 
hormones are meant to control ovulation and vaginal fluid levels 
to prevent egg fertilization.118  Both products initially showed 
 
 109.  David J. Morrow, Maker of Norplant Offers a Settlement in Suit Over Effects, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/27/us/maker-of-
norplant-offers-a-settlement-in-suit-over-effects.html. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Shari Roan, The Chill in Birth Control Research, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 1998), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/mar/23/news/mn-31897. 
 112.  See CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, INTRODUCTION, AND USE: LESSONS FROM 
NORPLANT, supra note 96, at 38. 
 113.  Id. at 12. 
 114.  See Birenbaum, supra note 37, at 412-13. 
 115.  Gordon Gibb, 10,000 Yaz and Yasmin Lawsuits Just a Cost of Doing 
Business?, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/yasmin-side-effects-yaz-
blood/yasmin-birth-control-lawsuit-side-50-19560.html. 
 116.  Drospirenone And Ethinyl Estradiol (Oral Route), MAYO CLINIC (Jan. 1, 2016), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/drospirenone-and-ethinyl-estradiol-
oral-route/description/drg-20061917. 
 117.  A.D.A.M., Inc., Birth Control and Family Planning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/specialtopic/birth-control-and-family-
planning/oral-contraception-and-combination-hormonal-methods.html. 
 118.  Zarah: Ethinyl Estradiol/Drospirenone, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-154621-5115/zarah-oral/ethinylestradiol-
drospirenone-oral/details (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
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great promise in preventing pregnancy and having convenient off-
label uses, including the treatment of hormone-related acne.119  
By 2009, however, the love affair with the new blend was over, 
with these “fourth generation” contraceptive pills becoming 
involved in high-profile product liability lawsuits.120  Otherwise 
healthy patients were dying or sustained injuries from pulmonary 
embolisms, deep vein thrombosis, and other blood clothing 
conditions.121  As of April 2014, Bayer had negotiated Yaz and 
Yasmin lawsuit settlements with about 8,560 claimants in the 
United States.122  To date, Bayer has paid $2 billion to settle 
Yasmin and Yaz litigation.123 
The German pharmaceutical giant is also facing a new wave 
of lawsuits concerning complications caused by its “Mirena” IUS 
birth control devices and its “Essure” permanent birth control 
devices.124  Mirena is the first IUD marketed since Dalkon 
Shield,125 and has been the subject of large-scale lawsuits over 
allegations that its warning label inadequately cautioned against 
the risk of side effects such as uterine perforation and 
migration.126  To date, 1,163 claims have been filed against Bayer 
for injuries resulting from its device.127  Many commentators have 
drawn comparisons to Dalkon Shield litigation, suggesting that 
the Mirena litigation is eerily reminiscent of that era.128  “Essure,” 
 
 119.  Yaz, DRUGS.COM, http:.//www.drugs.com/yaz.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
 120.  Yaz/Yasmin Products Liability Litigation: February 2014 Bayer Information 
About the Number of Claims, Lawsuits, and Settlements, DRUG INJURY WATCH (Mar. 
12, 2014) (posted by Tom Lamb), http://www.drug-
injury.com/druginjurycom/2014/03/yaz-beyaz-yasmin-safyral-lawsuits-filed-claims-
unfiled-total-settlements-bayer-litigation-report-february-2014-information.html. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Yaz Lawsuit Settlements, DRUG REP. (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://drugreporter.com/yaz/lawsuit-settlements/. 
 123.  Austin Kirk, Bayer Still Faces 4,000 Yaz and Yasmin Lawsuits, Even After 
$2B in Settlements, ABOUTLAWSUITS.COM (July 21, 2015), 
http://aboutlawsuits.com/yaz-yasmin-lawsuits-after-settlements-85394/. 
 124.  Laura Woods, Essure Lawsuits Cite Issues Similar to Mirena IUD 
Complications, Surgical Watch (June 4, 2015), 
http://surgicalwatch.com/2015/06/essure-lawsuits-cite-issues-similar-mirena-iud-
compliactions/. 
 125.  Jennifer Mesko, Mirena IUD Litigation Revives Memories of Dalkon Shield 
Injuries, Drugwatch (June 28, 2013), http://drugwatch.com/2013/06/28/mirena-
litigation-dalkon-shield-injuries/. 
 126.  Eleanor Smith, Mirena IUD’s Harmful Side Effects Lead to Multidistrict 
Litigation, Nat’l Trial Lawyers (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://www.thenationaltriallawyers.org/2015/09/mirena-iud-harming-women/. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See Mesko, supra note 125. 
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on the other hand, involves the insertion of two metal coils inside 
the fallopian tube and is meant to instigate a natural tissue 
inflammation response to block sperm.129  Litigation on Essure 
has just started to get off the ground, with the first lawsuit being 
filed in 2014.130  While the precise implications of the Mirena and 
Essure litigation is still unclear, these lawsuits suggest that 
Bayer will approach with caution its investments in additional 
cutting-edge products. 
IV. THE RISE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
The mass tort litigation that has plagued the pharmaceutical 
and medical device industry over the past thirty years has 
spurred greater interest from commentators, scholars, and 
politicians in offering manufacturers immunity from product 
liability lawsuits.131  In support of immunity, legal commentators 
and defense attorneys have pointed to the strong basis “that 
product liability has been a major factor in discouraging efforts to 
develop new contraceptives.”132  Simply speaking, the threat of 
liability and subsequent negative publicity has lessened the 
economic incentives to become involved in “high risk” medical 
products.  Over the past ten years, supporters of immunity have 
successfully advocated for judicial recognition of the affirmative 
defense of federal preemption to shield manufacturers from 
burdensome liability.133 
 
 129.  How Does the Essure® Procedure Work?, Essure: Permanent Birth Control 
(Mar. 2016), http://www.essure.com/what-is-essure/how-essure-works. 
 130.  Lauren Gilger, Federal Judge to Decide on Lawsuits Challenging Protected 
Status of Essure Birth Control, ABC 15 (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/federal-judge-to-rule-on-
lawsuits-challenging-protected-status-of-essure-birth-control. 
 131.  See, e.g., Joseph F. Petros III, The Other War on Drugs: Federal Preemption, 
the FDA, and Prescription Drugs After Wyeth v. Levine, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 637, 661 (2012) (“[D]enying federal preemption in prescription drug 
regulation will deter innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.”); Lisa M. Mottes, The 
Need for Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims in the Context of “New Drugs” and 
Premarket-Approved Medical Devices, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 723, 726 (2011) (arguing 
the FDCA should be amended to include express preemption provision for new drugs); 
and RICHARD EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 201 (2006) (arguing federal preemption is 
preferable to product liability litigation).  
 132.  See Garber, supra note 107, at xiv. 
 133.  Eric Lindenfeld & Jasper L. Tran, Beyond Preemption of Generic Drug 
Claims, 45 Sw. L. Rev. 101, 104 (2016) (“While the Supreme Court has historically 
abided by a strong presumption against implied preemption, the Court has displayed 
a growing willingness to reverse their traditional preemption doctrine.  This is 
especially true in their decisions relating to the FDCA and the preemption of claims 
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A.  FEDERAL IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION 
The doctrine of preemption originates from the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution, which states that 
federal law “shall be the supreme law of the land. . . . [A]ny Thing 
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”134  The Supreme Court has since recognized 
that State laws that conflict with federal law are “without 
effect.”135  There are two ways that a federal law and a state law 
can “conflict,” either expressly or impliedly.136  The doctrine of 
“express preemption” is self-explanatory, applied when federal 
legislation or regulation includes language expressly preempting 
state law.137  Implied preemption is applied in three scenarios: (1) 
“where state law creates an obstacle for compliance with federal 
law”; (2) where federal law “occupies an entire field so as to create 
an ‘inference of federal exclusivity’”; or (3) “where it is impossible 
for one to comply with both federal and state law.”138  Over the 
past six years, pharmaceutical companies have been arguing in 
favor of the third option, also known as “impossibility 
preemption.”139  As this argument goes, it is impossible to comply 
with state law tort standards while simultaneously complying 
with its duties under the federal, Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA).140  Therefore, companies argue that state law tort 
standards should be preempted and plaintiffs should be barred 
from bringing state tort lawsuits relating to the drug or device in 
 
made against manufacturers of generic drugs.”). 
 134.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 135.  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 427 (1819); See also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 
108 (1992) (internal quotation omitted) (“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which 
our pre-emption doctrine is derived. ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s 
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”); 
Felder v. Case, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). 
 136.  Tyler W. Olson, The Supreme Court’s Overreaching Preemption Interpretation 
and Its Consequences: Granting Generic Drug Manufacturers Legal Immunity 
Through “The Duty of Sameness” in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett and PLIVA 
v. Mensing, 12 Ind. Health L. Rev. 769, 783 (2015) (citing Jennifer S. Hendricks, 
Preemption of Common Law Claims and the Prospects for FIFRA: Justice Stevens Puts 
the Genie Back in the Bottle, 15 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F 65, 69 (2004)). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 784 (quoting Hendricks, supra note 136, at 70). 
 139.  See Lindenfeld & Tran, supra note 133, at 105 (“Over the past five years, the 
Supreme Court has addressed whether the ANDA approval process and its 
corresponding federal ‘sameness’ requirement, conflicts with duties imposed by state 
tort law.”). 
 140.  Id. at 106. 
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question.141 
B.  PHARMACEUTICAL PREEMPTION 
The FDCA requires FDA approval for a new drug through its 
“New Drug Approval” (NDA) process.142  Understanding that the 
NDA process is often prohibitively expensive, and recognizing the 
need to stimulate the market for generic drugs, Congress 
eventually implemented the less-arduous Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) approval process.143  The ANDA approval 
process, which is meant to be a less demanding standard than the 
NDA, only requires that a generic manufacturer show that the 
drug it seeks to have approved is bioequivalent to an already 
approved NDA-approved drug.144  Additionally, the generic 
manufacturer applying for ANDA approval must ensure that the 
generic drug’s label always matches its brand-name 
counterpart.145  Any dissimilarity between the two labels will 
cause the generic drug’s ANDA application to be denied.146  These 
requirements have been dubbed as the “duty of sameness.”147  
Over the past six years, large generic manufactures have 
successfully argued that they were unable to comply with state 
law tort standards because of the ANDA regulations that require 
“sameness” in bio-content and warnings of the generic and brand 
name drug.148 
 
 141.  Id. at 108. 
 142.  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355). 
 143.  Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-
Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 417, 426 
(2011) (“This shorter, less-expensive ANDA mechanism for receiving drug approval 
has created a boom in the generic drug industry.”). 
 144.  21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2013); see also Kelly, supra note 143, at 
417 (“Instead of having to submit lengthy preclinical and clinical data demonstrating 
the drug’s safety and efficacy to FDA, like that required in an innovator’s New Drug 
Application (‘NDA’), the only scientific data that a generic manufacturer must submit 
to FDA is data that the drug is ‘bioequivalent’ to the pioneer drug.”). 
 145.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i) (2012). Certain exceptions to this requirement may 
apply. 
 146.  21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)(7), (j)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 147.  Danielle L. Steele, The “Duty of Sameness” as a Shield—Generic Drug 
Manufacturers’ Tort Liability and the Need for Label Independence After PLIVA, Inc. 
v. Mensing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 441, 483-84, 487 (2013) (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574-75, 2593 (2011)). 
 148.  Caitlin Sawyer, Duty of “Sameness”?: Bartlett Preserves Generic Drug 
Consumers’ Design Defect Claims, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent/cgi?article=3281&context=bclr. 
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For example, in 2009, in PLIVA v. Mensing,149 the United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff’s state law, failure-
to-warn claims were preempted because it was impossible for the 
generic manufacturer to create more robust, and inclusive, 
warnings without violating the federal rules regarding 
“sameness.”150  Similarly, in 2013, in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. 
v. Bartlett,151 the Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to 
preempt design defect claims made against the manufacturer of 
the generic drug, Clinoril.152  Relying heavily upon the reasoning 
in Mensing, the Court ruled that New Hampshire’s common law 
duty to ensure that a product’s design is adequate was preempted 
by the federal law that forbids a generic manufacturer from 
making any unilateral changes to a drug’s design that would 
cause it to differ from the brand name.153 
Recently, courts have begun to extend the reasoning in 
Mensing and Bartlett beyond claims against generic 
manufacturers to apply to brand name manufacturers.154  For 
example, in 2015, in Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,155 the Sixth Circuit became the first 
appellate authority to extend the Bartlett design-defect 
preemption rationale to a brand name drug.156  In Yates, a woman 
suffered a severe stroke one week after beginning the Ortho Evra 
contraceptive patch.157  The court ruled that, because the 
pharmaceutical company could not make major, unilateral 
changes to the composition of a drug post-approval, it was 
impossible for the company to comply with the New York tort 
standards relating to defectively designed products.158  James 
Beck, leading medical device and pharmaceutical product liability 
scholar, has tallied five other lower-court decisions that have 
applied impossibility preemption to brand name drug products—
a notable shift in the preemption landscape to an even more 
 
 149.  131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 150.  Id. at 2570, 2578 (2011); see also id. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 151.  133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 152.  Id. at 2477-78.  
 153.  Id. at 2470, 2477. 
 154.  James M. Beck, Another Decision Applying Bartlett Preemption to All Drugs, 
DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2015), 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2015/10/another-decision-applying-
bartlett.html; see also Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 155.  808 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 156.  Id. at 293 
 157.  Id. at 288. 
 158.  Id. at 300. 
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inclusive regime.159 
C.  MEDICAL DEVICE PREEMPTION 
Like pharmaceutical products, certain classes of medical 
devices are required to undergo significant FDA testing before 
approval.160  And, also like pharmaceutical products, courts have 
authoritatively construed the Medical Device Amendments 
(MDA) to the FDCA to preempt any claims made against certain 
classes of medical device products.161  For example, in 2008, in 
Riegel v. Medtronic,162 the Supreme Court denied a design defect 
claim made against a device manufacturer on the grounds that 
state law claims were expressly preempted by the MDA.163 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, was rather forthright with respect 
to the growing skepticism of excessive liability for medical device 
and drug manufacturers when he stated that tort liability under 
negligence or strict liability is “less deserving of preservation” in 
the face of federal regulations.164  Many scholars have attributed 
this skepticism to preemption’s rise and have noted that “[e]ven 
when courts are using the language of preemption doctrine, they 
may to some extent be seeking to reform products liability 
litigation.”165 
Interestingly, there has been a recent push to apply 
impossibility preemption to 510(k) approved products by utilizing 
the same theories developed in Mensing.166  The 510(k) approval 
is the medical device equivalent to the generic drug, ANDA 
 
 159.  See Beck, supra note 154 (“Just last month we collected all the favorable 
precedent applying impossibility preemption under [Bartlett] to innovator drugs – 
although the precise subject of that post was preemption of design defect claims 
involving § 510(k) medical devices.  We were aware of four such rulings, all in the last 
year or so: [Yates]; Shah v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.; Booker v. Johnson & Johnson; 
[and] Amos v. Biogen Idec, Inc.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 160.  See Robin Helmick Turner, Preemption of State Product Liability Claims 
Involving Medical Devices: Premarket Approval as a Shield Against Liability, 72 
WASH. L. REV. 963, 965-68 (1997). 
 161.  Id. at 963, 973-74, 976, 990, 994. 
 162.  552 U.S. 312. 
 163.  Id. at 316, 321 
 164.  Id. at 325. 
 165.  Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and Bit of a Fall) as Products 
Liability Reform: Wyeth, Riegel, Altria, and the Restatement (Third)’s Prescription 
Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 729 (2009). 
 166.  James M. Beck, In Case of Good Judge, Break Glass – Implied Impossibility 
Preemption in Cases Involving § 510(k) Cleared Medical Devices, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail/aspx?g=c2c67d65-2032-4bca-a382-
0550cd82de10. 
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approval process.167  510(k) products have not traditionally been 
subject to the protections offered by the MDA express 
preemption.168  As a result, this category of devices has been the 
prime target of a litany of state tort law claims over the past five 
years.169  James Beck touches on these recent developments in a 
recent article, arguing that the 510(k) “substantial equivalence” 
process is amenable to a “duty of sameness” type of argument as 
used in the Mensing and Bartlett decisions.170  While no known 
cases have yet to utilize such an argument, we should expect to 
see defendants test the boundaries of the MDA’s precise 
preemptive scope. 
D.  FEDERAL PREEMPTION IS A POOR SOLUTION TO THE 
GROWING CRISIS 
Despite data suggesting that manufacturers may respond 
positively to a decrease in potential liability,171 federal 
preemption is an unnecessarily broad, and draconian approach, 
with concerning implications for those injured by medical and 
pharmaceutical products.172  Under a federal preemption regime, 
all users of medical and pharmaceutical products are barred from 
bringing any claims under either strict liability or negligence 
theories.173  This problem is particularly troublesome for women, 
who have historically suffered more severe, physically grotesque 
and personal injures than the typical consumer, and are now at 
an even greater risk of being barred from any form of 
compensation.174  This is especially true for low-income women, 
who are more likely to opt for the generic substitute of any oral 
contraceptive product—liability for which has already been 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See id. 
 170.  See id. Beck cautions defense attorneys that such an approach should only be 
taken “[i]n cases where you believe this novel defense-side argument will receive fair 
consideration and bears a colorable chance of success.” 
 171.  Lindsey K. Peterson, Evading Preemption: The State’s Search for Recovery for 
the Masses, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 403, 424 (2015). 
 172.  Id. at 404. 
 173.  See Lindenfeld & Tran, supra note 133, at 103, 108, 110, 112-13; see also Jesse 
Morris, Third Circuit Confirms Preemption Scope of Mensing and Bartlett, PRODUCT 
LIAB. MONITOR (May 6, 2014), http://product-liability.weil.com/preemption/third-
circuit-confirms-preemption-scope-of-mensing-and-bartlett/. 
 174.  Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice 
in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24, 29, 48, 53-54 (1995). 
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foreclosed by the holdings in Mensing and Bartlett.175 
Federal preemption may even contribute to a decrease in the 
use of contraceptive products, and, thus, to an increase in the 
unwanted pregnancy rate.176  Women, who will have inevitably 
heard of the succession of contraceptive failures and injuries, will 
also be aware that they are now at risk for a lack of compensation 
should they be injured.  These women will increasingly turn to 
more benign, and less effective, modes of birth control.177  
Similarly, doctors will turn to prescribing lower risk, and less 
effective, contraceptive products to insulate themselves from 
potential liability arising from the use of contraceptive 
products.178  In this sense, federal preemption will also have a 
cooling effect on the market for contraceptive products that offsets 
any benefits that might be achieved through insulation of 
liability. 
Most importantly, proponents of federal preemption place too 
much faith upon the FDA regulatory process in ensuring that a 
product is dispenses at its maximum safety levels.179  The threat 
of liability has been determined to be one of the most significant 
motivators in ensuring that manufacturers engage in thorough 
pre- and post-market testing of their products.180  Indeed, the 
FDA sets only a minimum threshold of safety and does not require 
or encourage vigorous aftermarket studies.181  Furthermore, pre-
 
 175.  See Lindenfeld & Tran, supra note 133, at 109 (“This void in pre-market and 
post-market safety for generic drugs is particularly troubling considering that the 
market for generic drugs increases exponentially every year, and that the primary 
consumers of generic drugs are low income.” (citing Daniel Perrone, Crafting an 
Exception to the Mensing Ruling, JURIST (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/04/daniel-perrone-generic-drugs.php.)). 
 176.  Marie Boyd, Unequal Protection Under the Law: Why FDA Should Use 
Negotiated Rulemaking to Reform the Regulation of Generic Drugs, 35 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1525, 1577 (2014). 
 177.  See id. (“Consumers concerned about the different potential legal remedies 
for brand-name and generic drugs may request brand-name drugs.”). 
 178.  See Daniel Kazhdan, Wyeth and PLIVA: The Law of Inadequate Drug 
Labeling, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 893, 894, 914-16 (2012) (Arguing federal 
preemption will create public pressure on states, doctors, and pharmacists to avoid 
prescribing medications of which private causes of action have been foreclosed by 
preemption). 
 179.  Elissa Levy, The Health Act’s FDA Defense to Punitive Damages: A Gift to 
Drug Makers or to the Public?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2448-49, 2451-52 (2006). 
 180.  See generally James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-
Liability Litigation: Where We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 657, 659 (2009) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 
(1992)). 
 181.  Brittany Croom, Buyer Beware: Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett 
Continues to Alter the True Costs and Risks of Generic Drugs, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
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marketing clinical trials are necessarily limited, as they cannot 
take into account all the long-term effects of a drug at the time of 
approval.182  As Justice Sotomayor aptly noted in her dissent in 
Mensing, “‘[s]tate tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and 
provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks 
promptly.’  Thus, we recognized, ‘state law offers an additional, 
and important, layer of consumer protection that complements 
FDA regulation.’”183 
Lastly, judicial recognition of federal impossibility 
preemption as a viable affirmative defense in the pharmaceutical 
and medical device arena will contribute to a volatile, and 
unpredictable, preemption regime.  A judicially-originated 
process of reform is an unavoidably haphazard, inconsistent 
process as jurisdictions begin to implement the general rule of 
law.  Recently, in Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson,184 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court exemplified this phenomenon 
when they refused to comply with over six years worth of federal 
case law precedent, holding that a claim against a drug 
manufacturer was not preempted because the defendant failed to 
show that the FDA did not approve a change in a drug’s label.185  
As Reckis demonstrates, judicial standards will necessarily 
become increasingly dissimilar and muddled as more jurisdictions 
increasingly grapple with federal preemption principles.186 
V. NO-FAULT FIX TO THE CONTRACEPTIVE AND 
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY CRISIS 
In light of the decreased research and development of 
contraceptive products, as well as the misguided application of 
 
ON. 1, 24, 29 (2014) (quoting Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing: Generic Consumers’ 
Unfortunate Hand, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 209, 245 (2012)), 
http://ncjolt.org/buyer-beware-mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett-continues-to-
alter-thetrue-costs-and-risks-of-generic-drugs/. 
 182.  See Cupp, supra note 165, at 752 (“The [Wyeth] Court emphasized that the 
FDA has only limited resources to monitor the thousands of drugs on the market, and 
that the tort system may be especially helpful in regulating new risks that may emerge 
in drugs’ postmarketing phase.”). 
 183.  PLIVA, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyeth v. 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202-03 (2009) (internal citation omitted)). 
 184.  28 N.E.3d 445, 458 (Mass. 2015). 
 185.  This is despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine was clear 
that a defendant was only required to show “clear evidence that the FDA would not 
have approved a change [in labeling].” See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198 (emphasis added). 
 186.  See generally Reckis, 28 N.E.3d at 455-61 (Mass. 2015). 
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federal preemption in response to such issues,187 lawmakers 
should be urged to investigate alternatives to the existing state 
law compensation schemes for injured consumers of contraceptive 
products.  The most plausible alternative to the existing scheme 
is a no-fault compensation plan for those injured by contraceptive 
products.  Such a scheme could be modeled around the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA).188 
A.  THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT OF 
1986 
The NCVIA189 was passed in response to shortages of 
vaccines in the 1970s and 1980s.190  Such shortages were a direct 
result of product liability lawsuits brought by consumers gravely 
injured by vaccine products.191  These lawsuits generated a 
greater perceived risk of exposure to vaccine manufacturers and 
caused them to effectively vacate the industry.192  The Act, 
intended to relieve much of the liability burden on manufacturers 
of these products,193 instituted a no-fault compensation plan for 
those injured by vaccines and related products.194  The Act 
authorizes the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) to 
issue pre-determined awards contingent upon a number of 
factors, including whether an alleged injury has is found to be 
“vaccine related.”195  However, no inquiry is made into whether 
the manufacturer had breached any duty of safety, and as such, 
it is truly a “strict liability” process.196 
Although those plaintiffs who disagree with the award can 
petition for redress of their claims in federal court under state-
law product liability standards,197 they are explicitly barred from 
bringing design defect and failure-to-warn claims, as well as from 
 
 187.  See discussion supra, Parts III.D. & IV.D. 
 188.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West 2015). 
 189.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West 2015). 
 190.  Kapil Kumar Bhanot, What Defense a Public Health Emergency? An Analysis 
of the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: The 
Need for Prevention of Nonterror National Medical Emergencies, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 137, 141 (2005). 
 191.  Id. (“The government’s initial response to vaccine shortages was to protect the 
vaccine industry from lawsuits.”). 
 192.  See Brown, supra note 44, at 1. 
 193.   42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West 2015). 
 194.  See Garber, supra note 107, at 40. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 18. 
 197.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(e)(1) (West 2015). 
LINDENFELD (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:41 AM 
310    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
receiving punitive damages absent “fraud,” “intentional and 
wrongful withholding of information,” or “other criminal or illegal 
activity.”198  The program is intended to be self-funded, and is 
financed by a seventy-five-cent excise tax on each sale of a 
vaccine.199  A claimant may recover lifelong medical expenses, lost 
earnings, attorney fees and up to $250,000 for pain and 
suffering.200 
B.  SUCCESS OF THE NCVIA 
The NCVIA has proven to be successful at insulating 
manufacturers from volatile and unpredictable liability from 
defective products.201  This is evidenced by a number of 
manufacturers returning to the vaccine market after the passage 
of the act, and the development new and useful products.202  
Indeed, only four years after passage of the act,203 the New York 
Times noted “a major revival in vaccine research by private 
pharmaceutical companies.”204  In the 1990s, the revival was even 
more dramatic—prices of vaccines had decreased dramatically, 
and more people were getting vaccinated than at any other time 
in history.205 
Most importantly, manufacturers have developed many 
vaccines that did not exist before the crisis,206 and have also 
 
 198.  Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 229, 243 (2011); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-
23(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West 2015). 
 199.  About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Trust Fund, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ADMIN. (HRSA), 
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 21, 
2016) (The Trust Fund is “[f]unded by a $.75 excise tax . . . on each dose (i.e., disease 
that is prevented) of a vaccine.”). 
 200.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15 (West 2015); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose 
of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons From the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1661 
(2015). 
 201.  Mary Holland, Louis Conte, & Robert Krakow, Unanswered Questions from 
the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: A Review of Compensated Cases of Vaccine-
Induced Brain Injury, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 480, 480, 486 (2011). 
 202.  Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans 
Opting out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 353, 408, 410 
(2004). 
 203.  See generally National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
300aa-1 (West 2015). 
 204.  See Arkin, supra note 101, at 17. 
 205.  See Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns 
Fifteen, 56 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 351, 357 (2001). 
 206.  See Sara Wexler, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth: The “Unavoidable” Vaccine Problem, 
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 93, 104 (2011) (“Since the 1986 enactment 
of the Vaccine Act, manufacturers have brought over twenty new vaccines to market.”). 
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improved significantly on existing vaccines.207  For example, in 
1986, children were immunized against seven diseases.208  Today, 
children are regularly immunized against eight additional 
diseases: haemophilus influenza type B, hepatitis A, hepatitis, B, 
influenza, meningococcal disease, pneumococcal disease, 
rotavirus, and varicella.209  Another notable example includes the 
recently developed HPV vaccine,210 which, in 2014, was FDA 
approved for administration to protect against nine strains of 
HPV, a cancer-causing virus.211  Other vaccines developed since 
the initiation of the Act now protect against two types of viruses 
that cause seventy-percent of cervical cancers.212  Drug 
manufacturers are also rushing to develop new, genetically-
engineered vaccines for diseases such as HIV, heroine addiction, 
cocaine addiction, and gonorrhea.213  And, while cancer vaccines 
have been pursued for years, dozens of potential vaccines are 
finally in the late stages of clinical trials.214 
Fascinating new techniques and delivery method have also 
been developed since the initiation of the Act.215  For decades, 
 
 207.  Scott, supra note 205, at 357. 
 208.  Brief Amici Curiae of the American Academy of Pediatrics and 21 Other 
Physician and Public Health Organizations in Support of Respondent at 27, 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 U.S. 223 (2011) (No. 09-152, 2010 WL 3017751, at *27. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  See FDA Approves Gardasil 9 for Prevention of Certain Cancers Caused by 
Five Additional Types of HPV, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.: FDA NEWS RELEASE (Dec. 
10, 2014), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm426485.htm. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Recommended Immunization 
Schedules for Persons Aged 0 Through 18 Years —- United States, 2010, 58 MMWR 1-
4 (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5851a6.htm; Ctrs. 
for Disease Control & Prevention, Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 56 
MMWR 1-24 (Mar. 12, 2007). 
 213.  See Barbara Loe Fisher, The Vaccine Culture War in America: Are You 
Ready?, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR. (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nvic.org/nvic-vaccine-
news/march-2015/the-vaccine-culture-war-in-america-are-you-ready.aspx (“Drug 
Companies . . . are rushing to licens[e] . . . vaccines for syphilis, gonorrhea, herpes, 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, chlamydia, hepatitis C, e-coli, cytomegalovirus, ebola, 
salmonella, norovirus, adenovirus, enterovirus, asthma, diabetes, obesity, high blood 
pressure, anti-smoking, anti-cocaine and anti-heroin use, and many more.”). 
 214.  The Future of Vaccines, VACCINES TODAY: THE BLOG (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://www.vaccinestoday.eu/diseases/the-future-of-vaccines-2/ (“In the past, plenty of 
vaccines have fallen at the last hurdle but vaccines for prostate cancer, colorectal 
cancer, brain tumours, and melanoma (amongst others) continue to look promising.  
Indeed, a prostate cancer vaccine has recently been given the thumbs up by regulators 
in the US.”). 
 215.  See A Report of the National Vaccine Advisory Committee: Strengthening the 
LINDENFELD (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2016  9:41 AM 
312    BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 17.2 
vaccines have strictly depended upon the “attenuation” technique, 
which relies on weakened or killed viruses to provoke an immune 
response.216  However, since the Vaccine Act, new and other 
cutting-edge techniques have been employed with high degrees of 
success.217  The first recombinant vaccine was licensed and 
approved in 1986 for use in the United States, first offering an 
effective method at preventing the Hepatitis B virus.218  Today, 
much of the new research depends on the “live recombinant 
vaccine” technique, which utilizes attenuated viruses or bacterial 
strains as delivery devices for genes intended to provoke an 
immune response.219  This technique has been touted as the most 
promising for development of an HIV vaccine.220  Another 
technique that shows great promise is the “DNA Vaccine,” which 
 
Supply of Routinely Recommended Vaccines in the United States, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., THE NAT’L VACCINE ADVISORY COMM. (NVAC), 
http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/nvac-vsr.html (“The VICP has assisted in stimulating 
the availability of new vaccines since its inception in 1988.”). 
 216.  Louis Pasteur, CHEMICAL HERITAGE FOUND., 
http://www.chemheritage.org/discover/online-resources/chemistry-in-
history/themes/pharmaceuticals/preventing-and-treating-infectious-
diseases/Pasteur.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (Discussing how Louis Pasteur’s 
research “led to his discovery of how to make vaccines by attenuating, or weakening, 
the microbe involved.”). 
 217.  Lisa Winter, Cutting-Edge Technology Aiding Development of Novel Synthetic 
Polio Vaccine, IFLSCIENCE (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.iflscience.com/health-and-
medicine/cutting-edge-technology-aiding-development-novel-synthetic-polio-vaccine. 
For a discussion on emerging technology, see generally Jasper L. Tran, To Bioprint or 
Not to Bioprint, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 123, 133 (2015) (discussing bioprinting); Jasper 
L. Tran, The Law and 3D Printing, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 505, 
505-07 (2015) (discussing 3D printing); Jasper L. Tran & Derek Tri Tran, 
(De)Regulating Neuroenhancement, 37 U. LA. VERNE. L. REV. 179, 183-91 (2015) 
(discussing neuroenhancement); Jasper L. Tran, A Primer on Digital Rights 
Management Technologies, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: A LIBRARIAN’S GUIDE 
(Catherine A. Lemmer & Carla P. Wale eds., 2016) (discussing digital rights 
management technologies); and Jasper L. Tran, Press Clause and 3D Printing, 14 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 75, 77 (2016) (“Technology is progressing at an extraordinary 
speed.”). 
 218.  See Types of Vaccines, VACCINES.GOV (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.vaccines.gov/more_info/types/ (“A recombinant subunit vaccine has been 
made for the hepatitis B virus.  Scientists inserted hepatitis B genes that code for 
important antigens into common baker’s yeast.  The yeast then produced the antigens, 
which the scientists collected and purified for use in the vaccine.”); Hepatitis B Vaccine 
History, HEPATITIS B FOUND. (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://www.hepb.org/professionals/hepatitis_b_vaccine.htm. 
 219.  See Types of Vaccines, supra note 218. 
 220.  This is because HIV cannot be attenuated enough to be given to humans, and 
could cause AIDS. See Types of HIV Vaccines, NAM: Aidsmap, 
http://www.aidsmap.com/types-of-hiv-vaccines/page/1065633/ (last visited Aug. 1, 
2016). 
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involves the injection of the DNA coding for an antigen directly 
into the muscle.221  This technique has been noted as a potentially 
potent weapon against diseases such as malaria.222 
C.  NCVIA AS A MODEL FOR THE CONTRACEPTIVE CRISIS 
The staggering costs of unwanted pregnancies, the increased 
dissatisfaction with existing contraceptive methods, and the lack 
of innovation in contraceptive products indicates a clear need for 
immediate congressional action.223  Given the tremendous growth 
and diversification of the vaccine industry following the passing 
of the NCVIA, it is suggested that an identical, no-fault approach 
be adopted for contraceptive products marketed in the United 
States.224  A no-fault system based on the NCVIA would strike an 
ideal balance of product safety and product innovation.  With 
threat of liability under the no-fault act, as well as through state 
law tort remedies, if a claimant is not satisfied with his no-fault 
act award, device manufacturers will still be motivated to prevent 
injury.  However, the no-fault system will not impose excessive 
liability upon manufacturers, as it will disallow punitive damages 
against manufacturers except in situations involving criminal 
conduct, fraud, or non-compliance with the FDCA.225 
With each manufacturer being required to “pay into” the 
system on a per-contraceptive-sold basis,226 device manufacturers 
will better be able to predict costs associated with producing a 
contraceptive product.  No longer will contraceptive 
manufacturing executives be leery of huge Dalkon-like awards, or 
 
 221.  Robert G. Whalen, DNA Vaccines for Emerging Infectious Diseases: What If?, 
2 Emerging Infectious Diseases 168, 168 (Sept. 1996), 
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/pdfs/vol2no3_pdf-version.pdf. 
 222.  Malaria: SynCon® Vaccines Targeting Malaria, INOVIO (2014), 
http://www.inovio.com/products/infectious-disease-vaccines/malaria/ (last visited Aug. 
1, 2016). 
 223.  See discussion supra, Parts III & IV. 
 224.  Janet Benshoof, Protecting Consumers, Prodding Companies, and Preventing 
Conception: Toward a Model Act for No Fault Liability for Contraceptives, 23 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 430-31 (1997). 
 225.  See Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for 
Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 808-09 n.25 (1994); Bruesewitz, 562 
U.S. at 229-30; 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-23(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West 2015); Katherine M. Glaser, 
A Step Toward Preemption: The Effect of the FDA’s 2006 Preamble, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 
871, 887 (2007). 
 226.  See, e.g., About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Trust Fund, supra note 195. 
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Norplant-like publicity.227  The claims will be quietly and 
efficiently settled through the no-fault program, offering adequate 
compensation for women injured by contraceptive products and, 
at the same time, avoiding huge windfalls for plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
It is conceded that significant questions remain in determining 
the precise dollar amount of the tax per contraceptive that 
manufacturers would be required to pay out.  It is also conceded 
that this amount would necessarily require constant 
modifications as dangers of particular products become more 
known and widespread.  However, the scheme clearly offers a 
significantly more balanced approach than what is currently in 
place. 
Of course, many women who have suffered non-economic 
damages exceeding the $250,000 cap may appear to be ill-served 
by the scheme.228  However, these claimants will still have the 
ability to pursue strict liability and negligence causes of action 
against a manufacturer should they be dissatisfied with their no-
fault award.229  Moreover, like the NCVIA, a no-fault program for 
contraceptive products would relieve a claimant from much of 
their burden of proving causation.230  This is because claimants 
would only be require to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
an injury suffered that is listed on a pre-determined table.231  
Most critically, women’s interest as a whole will increasingly be 
advanced as research and development into newer and safer 
 
 227.  See discussion supra, Part III (discussing the tremendous impact Norplant 
publicity and Dalkon Shield jury awards had upon the profitability of those devices). 
 228.  This problem is particularly troubling given that women have traditionally 
suffered more grotesque and life-altering injuries as a result of defective products. A 
contraceptive device is likely to cause similar catastrophic injuries that far exceed the 
mandated cap. See generally Koenig & Rustad, supra note 174, at 23, 80, 85, 87. 
 229.  Under a no-fault scheme, a woman dissatisfied with her award will have even 
more litigation options than a consumer of a vaccine product that is dissatisfied with 
his or her award.  This is because, under Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, 
comment k, strict liability claims against vaccine manufacturers are precluded. 
However, no such preclusion categorically applies to contraceptive products. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1965) 
 230.  Michael Regan, Health Care Law-Resolving Disputed Diagnoses Prior to 
Applying the Althen Test in Claims Brought Pursuant to the National Childhood 
Vaccine Act—Lombardi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 656 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 315, 320 (2013). 
 231.  William Dobreff, The National Vaccine Compensation Act No-Fault for 
Vaccine Injuries, 69 MICH. B. J. 806, 807 (1990) (“For certain types of injuries occurring 
within the time frame set forth on the table after administration of the vaccine there 
is a presumption of causation.  The burden of proof for proving a Table case is a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
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contraceptives becomes reinvigorated as a result of the scheme.232 
D.  MODIFICATIONS AND COMPLIMENTS TO A NCVIA-TYPE 
SYSTEM 
As discussed in Section C., the NCVIA does not explicitly 
foreclose private actions against a vaccine manufacturer so long 
as the claimant has exhausted all his avenues through the Act.233  
The Act does, however, explicitly prohibit claimants from ever 
alleging failure to warn claims in the private suit.234  In 2011, 
vaccine manufacturers were further insulated from private suits 
when the Supreme Court, in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,235 held 
that claimants are also forever prohibited from bringing design 
defect claims against a manufacturer of a vaccine.  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, was characteristic in his assault on state 
tort liability when he held that design defect claims are “[t]he 
most speculative and difficult type of products liability claim to 
litigate,”236 and leaving them available to plaintiffs would “hardly 
coax manufacturers back into the market.”237  In this respect, and 
in the face of the Supreme Court’s long-held presumption against 
preemption,238 the Supreme Court held almost all avenues of 
private redress against vaccine manufacturers as completely 
foreclosed.239  The impact of the decision will have enormous 
rippling effects on product safety and claimant recovery for those 
injured for vaccine products.240 
 
 232.  See discussion supra, Parts III & V. 
 233.  See discussion supra, Part V.B. 
 234.  Id.  
 235.  Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 243. 
 236.  Id. at 240. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Kendra D. Hanson, The End of Design-Defect Claims: The Supreme Court’s 
Immunization of Vaccine Manufacturers in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC [131 S. Ct. 1068 
(2011)], 51 WASHBURN L. J. 737, 746 (2012) (“Because preemption has such significant 
effects, the Supreme Court has established what has come to be known as a 
presumption against preemption.”). 
 239.  Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 243. 
 240.  See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 238, at 765 (arguing that state design-defect 
claims should be allowed to proceed because of their powerful role in supplementing 
federal regulations regarding vaccine safety: “such a system is better not only for the 
individual plaintiffs but for public safety as a whole.”); Eva B. Stensvad, Immunity for 
Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 95 
Minn. L. Rev. 315, 318 (2011) (Arguing that the Bruesewitz Court put a sizeable 
portion of consumers at unnecessary risk); and Mary J. Davis, The Case Against 
Preemption: Vaccines & Uncertainty, 8 Ind. Health L. Rev. 293, 316 (2011) (discussing 
the disastrous effects of foreclosing design defect claims against vaccine 
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Considering the recent decision in Bruesewitz, when drafting 
a no-fault act for contraceptives, Congress should be explicit and 
unambiguous in allowing design defect and failure to warn claims 
to proceed if a claimant has exhausted all remedies under the act.  
A no-fault system that shield contraceptive manufacturers from 
large-scale liability is necessary to reinvigorate the contraceptive 
market.  However, this system should be carefully balanced 
against a claimant’s ability to be made whole.241  In the future, 
there will invariably be women severely injured from 
contraceptive products who cannot with precision prove 
placement on any pre-determined, injury/compensation table, and 
who require alternative, civil remedies.242  As discussed in 
previous sections, wholesale preemption of any class of injury is 
an unnecessarily draconian approach that can cause 
manufacturers to purposely disregard information about 
deficiencies in their warnings or design.243 
In adopting a no-fault act for contraceptives, Congress should 
also be aware that drug manufacturers may not immediately be 
receptive to a decrease in liability, especially with a new tax 
imposed upon them by the no-fault act.244  In the event that the 
market is not immediately responsive, Congress should consider 
adopting an Orphan Drug Act245-type of approach to complement 
the no-fault system, and to jump start investment by private 
manufacturers.246  The Orphan Drug Act, passed in 1983, was 
created to attract manufacturers to design products for a market 
that would otherwise be too small to be profitably by giving them 
monopoly rights over the market.247  The Act has proven 
successful in facilitating the research or development of drugs for 
rare diseases, such as ALS, Huntington’s disease, and Myoclonus, 
 
manufacturers). 
 241.  See Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and 
Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1856, 1902 (1995) 
(Arguing that no-fault scheme generally serves its purpose, but must take into account 
policy considerations including product safety and ability of injured claimant to be 
made whole). 
 242.  Benshoof, supra note 224, at 425. 
 243.  See discussion supra, Part IV.C. 
 244.  Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United 
States: Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 636 (1993). 
 245.  Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 360aa). 
 246.  See Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right With It, 15 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 299, 304, 325-26, 344 (1999) (discussing the incredible 
promise of an orphan drug-oriented scheme). 
 247.  See id. at 301, 310. 
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which all affect small numbers of people residing in the United 
States.248  Under an Orphan Drug Act approach, a limited number 
of contraceptive manufacturers could be given exclusive market 
control for a set period of time, contingent upon their development 
of new and cutting-edge contraceptive technologies.249 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the United States, there is an ongoing public health 
problem relating to unintended pregnancies.  The unintended 
pregnancy rate is particularly concerning, given that childbirths 
that result from unintended or closely-spaced pregnancies are 
correlated with negative outcomes for the parent and child.  While 
it is true that two-thirds of women in the United States are on 
some form of contraception,250 almost half of all unintended 
pregnancies result from women who use their contraception 
inconsistently or incorrectly.251  The most widely reported reason 
for contraceptive nonuse or gaps in use is dissatisfaction with 
available contraception methods and concerns about side effects 
of alternatives.252 
Despite the fact that women consistently express 
dissatisfaction with existing contraception methods,253 the 
availability of the newer, safer, and more comfortable 
contraceptive methods remains stagnant.254  The threat of 
excessive liability, as evidenced from the Dalkon Shield and 
 
 248.  Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(1), 96 Stat. 2049 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 360aa) (“[T]here are many diseases and conditions, 
such as Huntington’s disease, myoclonus, ALS (Lou Gehrig’s disease), Tourette 
syndrome, and muscular dystrophy which affect such small number of individuals 
residing in the United States that the diseases and conditions are considered rare in 
the United States.”). 
 249.  Benshoof, supra note 224, at 430. 
 250.  See Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 3 (Mar. 
2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/FB-Unintended-
Pregnancy-US.pdf. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  CDC Report Shows Women Highly Likely to Discontinue Use of Hormonal 
Contraceptive Methods, CYCLEBEADS (July 15, 2013), 
https://www.cyclebeads.com/blog/801/cdc-report-shows-women-highly-likely-to-
discontinue-use-of-hormonal-contraceptive-methods. 
 253.  See id. 
 254.  See generally The Stagnant Contraceptives Industry: Birth Control: Lawsuits, 
Red Tape and The Religious Lobby Have Slowed Innovations, Drug Firms Say. The 
Pill Remains the Most Trusted Method., L.A. TIMES (May 17, 1995), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-05-17/business/fi-2897_1_birth-control-methods. 
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Norplant litigation,255 has caused contraceptive manufacturers to 
abandon the market in droves.256  Only a few contraceptive 
manufacturers continue to invest in contraceptive research.257  
Over the past ten years, critics of liability have successfully 
advocated for judicially imposed federal preemption of drug and 
device claims as the primary vehicle to shield manufacturers from 
burdensome liability.258  However, despite the data that suggests 
that manufacturers may respond positively to a decrease in 
potential liability,259 federal preemption is an unnecessarily broad 
and radical approach to implications for those injured by medical 
and pharmaceutical products.260 
Lawmakers should be urged to investigate alternatives to the 
existing state law compensation schemes and wholesale 
preemption of contraceptive products.  The most plausible 
alternative to the existing scheme is a no-fault compensation plan 
for those injured by contraceptive products.261  Such a scheme 
could be modeled around the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act of 1986, which has proven to be successful at insulating 
manufacturers from volatile and unpredictable liability from 
defective products.  Most importantly, a no-fault system based on 
the NCVIA might strike an ideal balance of contraceptive product 
safety and product innovation. 
 
 
 255.  See supra notes 68-79, 100-07, and accompanying text. 
 256.  See supra notes 37-42, and accompanying text. 
 257.  See supra note 42, and accompanying text. 
 258.  See supra note 133, and accompanying text. 
 259.  See supra note 171, and accompanying text. 
 260.  See supra note 172, and accompanying text. 
 261.  See supra Part V. 
